I Introduction
The Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMC Act) comes at an opportune time to reform securities law as New Zealand's financial markets continue to develop in new directions to embrace the internet era. Internationally, start-up businesses are increasingly turning to the realms of cyberspace to gain support for their products and ideas, particularly through crowd funding platforms, due to the reduction in marketing, distribution and transactional costs. The newest form of crowd funding raises capital by offering unlisted equity shares for issue to the public through internet platforms. This is commonly used to encourage the development and growth of early-stage entrepreneurial businesses. Due to the nature of such businesses, compliance costs associated with full disclosure requirements are usually unviable. Increasingly, governments see it as desirable to promote this type of market with flexible regulatory regimes that loosen disclosure requirements without limiting who can invest. The FMC Act allows for the creation of a crowd funding exclusion, which is now in force. 2 Crowd funding is a high risk investment. Venture businesses have high failure rates internationally of around 75 per cent. 3 Other risks include higher vulnerability to fraud and lack of liquidity. 4 It is important these risks are balanced by investor protection mechanisms, allowing flexibility for the market to develop without exposing investors to significant risks.
This essay argues that the regulations should impose a mandatory investor cap that is proportional to the amount an issuer is raising. A cap of five per cent of the amount being raised is appropriate, with the option of stricter caps imposed by the platform provider. In addition, more prescription of warning statements is needed, consistent with the approach internationally. The need for protective measures is exacerbated by the difficulties in attaching liability to platform providers and issuers under the exclusion.
II Defining Equity Crowd Funding

A Background
Crowd funding is "a way in which people, organisations and businesses can raise money through online portals … to finance or re-finance their activities and enterprises".
5
Typically such a process involves "pooling a large number of small contributions … generally over the internet". 6 Internationally it is a growth industry, raising USD 2,700,000,000 and successfully funding over 1,000,000 campaigns in 2012. 7 This figure accounts for all four types of crowd funding: donation, reward, equity and debt.
Donation and reward crowd funding are the largest contributors to the crowd funding economy. They are not regulated by financial market laws as they are not classed as investments. Typically they support creative projects and can involve any sort of reward, from a simple thank you to a physical product.
Equity and debt crowd funding are types of "financial return" crowd funding, 8 which has typically been heavily regulated in most jurisdictions until recently as it falls within the ambit of securities law. This is understandable as investments in start-up businesses carry high risks alongside the potential for big returns. Access to equity crowd funding has the benefit of giving initial supporters of a business a vested interest in its continued success.
Oculus VR raised USD 2,400,000 from 9,522 crowd backers through reward crowd funding in 2012 for the development of its virtual-reality gaming goggles. crowd funding, the backers would have shared in those profits.
B The Legislative Definition
Under the FMC Act, an offer of financial products, which includes equity securities, 10 requires disclosure under Part 3 of the Act unless an exclusion under Part 1 of Schedule 1 applies.
11 Disclosure involves preparing a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) and lodging information on the register, 12 the contents of each prescribed by regulation. 13 The purpose of the PDS is to provide information that is likely to assist a prudent but nonexpert person to decide whether or not to acquire the financial products. 14 The register entry must contain all material information relating to the offer that is not contained in the PDS. 15 This disclosure is costly, time-consuming and has significant liability attached where compliance is not adhered to, making it impractical for entrepreneurial enterprises which historically turn to excluded investors for funding, such as venture capitalists and angel investors.
An offer of financial products has since 1 April 2014 been excluded from the disclosure requirements under Part 3 (and exempt from the Securities Act until it is repealed) 16 if it is made by or through a licensed intermediary (platform provider) in the course of supplying prescribed intermediary services covered by its market services license. 17 Prescribed intermediary services are crowd funding services and peer-to-peer lending services.
18
Crowd funding platforms are services that provide "a facility by means of which offers of shares in a company are made", for the purpose of facilitating "the matching of companies who wish to raise funds with many investors who are seeking to invest relatively small amounts". 19 This is different to peer-to-peer lending, which involves offers of debt compliance costs, but is not supported by any of the traditional investor protection policy considerations as it is an offer to the public. Instead, the crowd funding exclusion reflects the policy of the Business Growth Agenda, which seeks to create opportunities for "new and innovative forms of capital raising" to support high-growth businesses to raise money more efficiently. 25 This approach is consistent with the purposes of the Act.
26
Although an issuer through a crowd funding service does not need to prepare a PDS or make register entries, that issuer is still bound by the other provisions of the FMC Act and there are specific provisions in the regulations applicable to both issuers and platform providers. Even with these regulations, the overall effect is to relax the previously strict enforcement of disclosure obligations for this type of service, with commentators indicating the exclusion "recognises … the fundamental role of the internet in business and communities", providing retail investors and businesses with more flexibility and control in how they respectively invest and raise risk capital. 
III Investment Caps
An issue at the heart of the crowd funding movement is whether the amount a retail investor can invest through crowd funding platforms should be capped. Imposing such caps reflects a policy of protecting less sophisticated investors from losing their entire investment portfolio due to the high risk nature of most crowd funded business, by effectively mandating diverse investing. These caps would complement other protections such as risk warnings and alternative, limited disclosures. Competing policy considerations include the practicality of caps being complied with and the restrictions they place on growth in the equity crowd funding economy by limiting access to capital, particularly from cornerstone investors. The approach to investor caps has varied significantly across different jurisdictions. 
A Investment Caps in International Jurisdictions
B The New Zealand Approach
The Financial Markets Conduct (Phase 1) Regulations 2014 do not impose a cap on the amount an investor may invest through intermediary services. A cap has been imposed on the amount an issuer may raise of an aggregate $2,000,000, which is breached when an issuer "exceeds $2 million in any 12-month period" from "relevant offers". 53 A "relevant offer" is an offer made in reliance on either the exclusion relating to peer-to-peer lending and crowd funding, or the small offers exclusion.
54
The decision not to impose investor caps in New Zealand is more liberal compared to international jurisdictions, reflecting policy that favours innovation and growth over strict 
C Policy Considerations
In considering investor caps, the Minister analysed whether a cap should apply per investor or per issuer and whether the cap should be a fixed amount or should vary according to investor income or wealth.
55
The exposure draft regulations presented four options for investor caps, the last being no cap at all. 56 The other options were: a fixed limit of $15,000 in shares from any one issuer, 57 a fixed limit of $50,000 in shares from all issuers 58 or a scaled limit of 10 per cent of gross income or net assets valued above $100,000 with a maximum investment cap of $100,000, or five per cent of gross income or net assets valued below $100,000 with a minimum cap of $2,000.
59
The Minister recognised 60 there is a strong policy argument for imposing investor caps, as the information that investors receive could be variable and there will be uncertainty around what returns will eventuate from a given investment. Receiving returns will likely take longer and the per-investor cap would "reduce the risk that large scale investor losses damage the credibility of equity-based crowd-funding and the regulatory regime as a whole".
61
Despite these reservations, the Minister's preferred approach was not to impose investor caps. Based on the decisions presented by the Minister to the Cabinet Business Committee, it is likely this was because no similar cap would exist for the small offer exclusion and an investor cap would be difficult to enforce.
62
The following policy considerations are relevant and suggest on balance that investor caps are desirable to protect investors.
Small Offer Consistency
The Minister asserted a cap "would create incentives for issuers to make separate offers to investors in reliance on the small offer exclusion". 63 However, the crowd funding and the small offer exclusions serve different purposes. Crowd funding is aimed at a large number of investors who invest "relatively small amounts", 64 whereas small offers are for where there is "no expectation of regulatory protections or compliance", such as a small business owner receiving funding from an acquaintance. 65 While small offers can cover some formal offers to members of the public, an issuer would still need to make "personal offers" to a small number of investors willing to invest substantial amounts in order to 59 Regulations 27(1)(h), 27(3) and 27(4 With a high chance that a business will default, it is important investors either:
 do a lot of background research into the venture they are supporting; or  are made sufficiently aware of the risks to know that they are more likely to lose than to gain; or  are protected from losing all of their investments by the restriction of an investment cap.
The social media aspect of crowd funding can offer a false sense of security, where instead of due diligence processes and adviser recommendations, investors rely on the wisdom of the crowd to decide whether an investment opportunity is a good one. 76 An investor that sees a popular project backed by a lot of people is less likely to do their own due diligence in reliance on the popularity of the project. 72 Gage, above n 3. Investors should only be providing funding they do not need for day to day cash flow.
82
An investor that invests a significant amount of their capital into crowd funding enterprises not only risks losing that money, which could comprise a large amount of their savings, but also will have no access to the capital for an indefinite period, assuming the business is successful enough to eventually make a return.
Investor caps could undermine liquidity by restricting the size of the market, as well as disadvantaging issuers listing towards the end of the annual period. Attempting to protect reckless investors may be inconsistent with the lack of restrictions on gambling. 90 The United Kingdom response to such a proposition was quite clear; the FCA refused to comment on that sector as they do not regulate it. 91 The comparison is not an overly appropriate one, as gambling is a game of chance where the risk of loss is generally well recognised or at least recklessly ignored, whereas the risks of investing in crowd funding are often downplayed and unknown to potential investors, who may think it is a safer investment than it actually is. 92 There are also significant differences between gambling and crowd funding. In particular, crowd funding is a way of fostering investment in New Zealand's capital markets and therefore to be encouraged.
On balance it is desirable to protect unsophisticated investors. An appropriate cap that could do this would limit the investor to a maximum investment of five per cent of the amount being raised in a particular offer. This approach reflects the principle that crowd funding is about small contributions from a large number of investors, distinguishing it from the small offers exclusion which adequately regulates larger investments.
IV Other Investor Protection Obligations
Where investor caps are not mandatory, it would be reasonable to expect some other form of consumer protection consistent with the purposes of the Act. Otherwise, there is an unfair disparity between smaller regulated offers made under the Act and offers excluded by the crowd funding exclusion. Investor caps are closely linked with other investor protection practices. Issuers under the exclusion want to give minimal disclosure to reduce costs, which reinforces the desirability of imposing a mandatory cap.
The main focus of New Zealand regulation applicable to crowd funding is on the obligations of the platform provider, in particular the requirements for licensing under Part This criterion indicates that although a mandatory investor cap was not imposed under the regulations, the FMA will take into account any investor caps imposed by the provider in deciding whether the disclosure arrangements are adequate and can require greater disclosure if they are not. The objective of the crowd funding exclusion to provide low cost funding to start-up businesses will be frustrated if these disclosure requirements are too onerous.
The provider must formulate appropriate disclosure policies to compliment any restrictions the provider decides to place on the amount issuers may raise and the amount investors may invest either in total or in a particular issue. Potentially this allows greater customisation and flexibility. However, this could result in issuers looking to raise more being required to comply with heavier disclosure which goes against the purpose of the exclusion. In the United States it could cost upwards of USD 100,000 to raise through a crowd funding portal due to the heavier disclosure required for offers between USD 500,000 and USD 1,000,000 combined with the percentage cut taken by service providers, making public equity crowd funding "one of the costliest forms of (legal) capital raising". 106 New Zealand must be careful not to require expensive disclosure that could choke the fledgling market, particularly as the market is likely to be relatively small, with only two licensed service providers approved thus far. 107 There is a risk of over regulating the market that must be balanced with the need to have adequate investor protection.
Imposing sufficient investor caps is an appropriate balance to lower disclosure requirements.
It will be for the FMA to determine whether the proposed disclosure processes are sufficient. If they are not, then assuming the platform provider has enforced the approved disclosure processes, it is the FMA that is ultimately at fault for approving processes that are not adequate for the situation. Such decisions are the exercise of delegated executive power and the courts cannot intervene except to the extent of judicially reviewing the decision. One issue with the approach is that the processes are assessed during the licence application, so flexibility is limited to whatever processes are approved by the FMA prior to issuers making offers through the service.
To encourage innovation and efficiency, a flexible approach is desirable subject to careful supervision by the FMA. 108 Approval of disclosure mechanisms will take a principlesbased approach. 109 The FMA has given some guidance regarding its expectations by issuing guidelines with minimum standards which should assist in assessing proposed mechanisms and may mitigate concerns around an overly liberal or restrictive approach to licensing.
110
Disclosure arrangements can include initial disclosure of information, question and answer forums between the investors and the issuer and links to other information sources, as well as carrying out checks on issuers which are disclosed to investors. 111 At a minimum, the FMA expects a dedicated webpage for each offer on the platform's website with information provided by the issuer that includes: a description of the business; the purpose of the offer; the terms including price, minimum funding sought, amounts raised so far, whether any investor caps apply and the rights attaching to the shares including details of any other securities of the issuer; information about the liquidity of the shares; the names and positions of the directors and senior managers; and arrangements with the issuer to supply required information.
112
108 Cabinet Business Committee, above n 55, at [126] . 109 At [129] . The FMA's intention is to insist on stronger disclosure where no investor protection is provided through investment caps imposed by the platform provider, resulting in a disclosure regime which, although still flexible to the needs of the platform with the details to be approved at the FMA's discretion, is closer to the sort of disclosure required under a PDS. The provision of key financial information could be less arduous than disclosure for regulated offers, which requires audited financial statements by a qualified auditor.
114
However, the costs will still be greater than for raises of smaller amounts, which may frustrate the attraction of crowd funding for start-up businesses as being a cost effective method of funding.
The implication of the FMA's guidance is that without investment caps, greater disclosure is expected causing greater expense. The Minister indicated that disclosure should be proportionate to the amount being raised. 115 This does not support the philosophy behind crowd funding, that it is low cost funding from a large crowd of investors each contributing small amounts. Greater disclosure increases costs significantly which deters issuers while providing little protection to investors to mitigate the identified risks of this type of investing. An approach that would put less pressure on platform providers and the FMA to develop complex disclosure arrangements would be to impose a mandatory cap of five per cent per issue, thereby limiting the risks to investors while keeping the disclosure compliance costs to a minimum. For raises of greater amounts, the expectation could be for greater disclosure unless the provider imposes a stricter cap. This would encourage providers to tailor their policies to the needs of the issuer, by providing the option of either reducing the maximum amount an investor can contribute while keeping disclosure to a minimum, or requiring higher disclosure where the issuer wishes for investors to be able to contribute up to the five per cent.
B Risk Warnings and Investor Confirmation
Educating investors about the risks of crowd funding is an important part of protecting them. Investor caps offer some protection from the risks, but proper understanding allows an investor to make their own informed decisions about whether the risks are right for them, promoting confident and informed participation. 116 As it is a new market it is important that investors recognise and agree to the risks from the outset, otherwise overoptimism may lead to bad investments and accusations by investors that they were misled.
117
A platform provider is required to display a warning statement on its home page and to an investor before they apply for or otherwise acquire financial products. 118 The warning tells the investor: that equity crowd funding is risky, involving businesses which are speculative and carry high risks; that the investor could lose their entire investment and must be in a position to bear that risk without undue hardship; that the usual rules for public offers do not apply and the investor has fewer legal protections; and that the investor should "ask questions, read all information given carefully, and seek independent financial advice before committing" to the offer.
119
Confirmation from the investor must also be obtained which states that the investor understands the risk of losing their entire investment, confirms they can bear the loss without undue hardship, understands that the usual legal protections do not apply to this investment and recognises they may not receive the same information usually required for a public offer. 120 This confirmation must be given separately to any agreement to use the service.
121
The concern with a risk statement which can be confirmed by simply checking a box on an internet page is that proper consideration will not be given to it. The United Kingdom requires a further step where the funding portal must assess the appropriateness of an unadvised investor to use its services, 122 as the FCA does not think risk warnings alone provide adequate consumer protection and at the least different risk warnings are needed in different circumstances instead of a single uniform warning. 123 Assessing appropriateness involves the investor providing information to the service regarding "his knowledge and experience in the investment field", from which the service will assess whether the investor has the necessary experience and knowledge to understand the risks involved.
124
The restrictions ensure that "only those retail investors who can understand and bear the various risks involved are invited to invest in unlisted shares".
125
Assessing investor appropriateness places a potentially heavy burden on the platform provider unless the assessment can be done through automated means. The requirement for an assessment of appropriateness could lead to access to the market being too restrictive for the average retail investor. A less arduous alternative could involve providing educational material followed by a questionnaire to demonstrate the investor's understanding, particularly of general risks and the risk of illiquidity, such as is required in the United States. 126 Italy similarly requires a questionnaire to be answered in order to demonstrate understanding of the essential features and main risks involved. 127 This approach would ensure investors take the time to read and process the warnings while still making it possible to administer through an automated process. Investor education requirements similar to the JOBS Act were initially proposed in New Zealand but dropped after the first round of submissions.
128
Without any sort of suitability assessment, the prescribed risk warnings only protect an investor that takes the time to read them. 129 If the purpose is to encourage flexibility and growth and not to protect reckless investors, a follow up test to the risk warnings may be unnecessary. On the other hand, it would not be a huge burden on the investment platform to administer a questionnaire, which would provide better education about crowd funding which the other jurisdictions recognise as important for encouraging growth in the emerging market.
V Attaching Liability
A concern for many investors is ensuring that those responsible are held accountable where there have been breaches of the mandatory disclosure regime. Such breaches can be civil, criminal or a mixture of both. This part assesses whether liability can be appropriately attributed to platform providers and/or issuers who act under the crowd funding exclusion, noting that the liability regime under Part 3 does not apply. While there are avenues for attaching liability to both the provider and issuer, it will be harder to attach liability, penalties will be lower and accessory liability is not as accessible.
A Liability for Breach of Licence Obligations under Part 6
Civil liability occurs when a civil liability provision is breached, which includes Part 6 services provisions. 130 When such a provision is contravened, the court may make a declaration of contravention 131 for the purpose of enabling the FMA (or an investor) to apply for a compensatory order under s 494 or other civil liability order under s 497.
132
The court may also, on the application of the FMA, make a pecuniary penalty order, payable to the Crown. 133 There are two tiers of pecuniary penalties. The higher tier has a maximum pecuniary penalty the greatest of: the consideration for the transaction constituting the contravention, three times the gain made or loss avoided by the contravention, $1,000,000 for an individual or $5,000,000 in any other case. 134 Any other civil liability provision has a maximum of $200,000 for the individual or $600,000 in any other case.
135
Civil liability attaches to many licence obligations, including the general reporting condition, the condition to notify the FMA regarding suspected contraventions of Part 2 and of the issuer cap, providing a disclosure document about the service to investors, providing risk warnings and receiving investor confirmation that they have read those risk warnings.
136
The regulations do not attach civil liability to breaches of the eligibility criteria, including administering the anti-fraud policy, fair dealing policy and adequate disclosure arrangements. Breach will have licensing consequences only. 137 The FMA has significant powers in the case of a licence contravention, which include censure of the licensee, requiring an action plan to be submitted, giving directions and suspending or cancelling the licence if it is satisfied the issuing requirements of s 396 are no longer met. 138 The FMA may also vary or revoke, add to or substitute any conditions of the licence.
139
Failure to submit an action plan or to comply with FMA directions gives rise to civil liability including a pecuniary penalty, as does failure to notify the FMA of a contravention or potential contravention of a market services licensee obligation in a material respect.
140
Therefore, where a licensee is acting fraudulently and knowingly allows its processes to be contravened, civil liability including a pecuniary penalty can be attached through the failure to report the contravention. 141 Liability can also attach to a licensee where it is "involved in a contravention", similar to secondary party liability under s 66 of the Crimes Act 1961. 142 Where the licensee simply fails to ensure its processes are followed, such as making sure adequate disclosure is given, and is unaware that this process was not properly followed, then licensing consequences apply. This could make it difficult to find a licensee liable where an issuer makes a false or misleading statement which would appear to the licensee to be true and adequate disclosure, restricting this avenue of liability where the issuer is insolvent. In such a case though, liability would be better placed on the issuer where possible, as the issuer is the one making the disclosure about the offer through the crowd funding platform.
Another avenue for liability against the provider is where it breaches the terms of the required client agreement. Implied into the client agreement is a duty to, when exercising any powers or performing any duties in relation to the service, "exercise the care, diligence, and skill that a prudent licensee … would exercise in the same circumstances". 143 This duty of care is similar to the duty trustees and directors owe.
144
Breach would give rise to a claim for breach of contract. Trust and company law may be relevant in assessing whether the duty has been breached in any particular case.
B Liability for Breach of Fair Dealing Obligations under Part 2
Civil liability also results from breach of Part 2 of the Act, which provides for fair dealing in relation to financial products. 145 The provisions in ss 19-23 apply equally to the licensee and the issuer as both are acting in trade by operating a business, activity of commerce or undertaking. 146 These provisions are useful for capturing conduct of the issuer which does not come under Part 3 due to the exclusion. Section 82 is the usual method of enforcing disclosure obligations, 147 but does not apply to crowd funding arrangements. Part 2 prohibits misleading or deceptive conduct generally, 148 false or misleading representations about specified aspects of the financial product 149 or unsubstantiated representations.
150
Conduct that may mislead the public as to the nature, characteristics, suitability for a purpose or quantity of financial products and services is also prohibited.
151
Intentionally including misleading information for the purposes of committing fraud is caught by these provisions, which are Part 2 fair dealing provisions and give rise to civil claims is intended as a safeguard against misleading or deceptive conduct, 160 preventing claims for example that a product is a "miracle cure" or organic when it is unclear what that claim means. 161 The prohibition requires claims to be supported and justified, which increases consumer confidence by increasing the credibility of claims.
162
As pecuniary penalties cannot be applied for when there is liability under s 19, it may be more favourable to look for liability in the other provisions. The specified representations that must not be false or misleading do not cover forecasts or the financial situation of a company. 163 These could potentially be argued to mislead as to the nature or characteristics of the financial product, although whether financial viability of an investment affects the inherent qualities of a product is tenuous. Liability will most likely be limited to s 19, providing only civil penalties.
Directors of the issuer involved in the contravention are not treated as having contravened
Part 2 provisions as they would be for a contravention of s 82. 164 A director may still be found liable for being involved in the contravention, but this must be proven by the prosecution rather than being automatic, creating a further hurdle to liability.
165
C Criminal Liability
Two avenues of criminal liability may be available against an issuer acting under the cl 6 exclusion. The Act creates a general offence for knowingly making or authorising a false or misleading statement in a document required by or for the purposes of the Act. 166 This is not limited to the narrow definition of disclosure document in s 6. Any document provided by an issuer to investors in reliance on the exclusion is likely "for the purposes of the Act".
The test is slightly different to s 19, requiring the statement to be false or misleading in a "material particular". 167 The offence carries a maximum sentence of five years, a fine not exceeding $200,000 or both. 168 This is significantly lower than contraventions of other defective disclosure provisions and has a higher mens rea standard.
169
The lower restriction and higher threshold seems appropriate given the restrictions on the amounts an issuer may raise under the exclusion and the lower disclosure requirements. It would be unreasonable to impose heavy fines and a recklessness standard on issuers who can only raise up to $2,000,000 a year and have lower disclosure standards.
Liability may also be found under the Crimes Act as recently amended, 170 which criminalises the publishing of any false statement with intent to induce a person to acquire financial products under the Act, either knowing or reckless as to whether it is false in a material particular, with a maximum imprisonment of 10 years. 171 This would predominantly apply to promoters but may also extend to a platform provider that let the false statement be published.
172
The liability regime overall is not as clear as it is for breaches of the main inadequate disclosure provisions of the Act and generally has lower penalties. There are difficulties with holding either the provider or the issuer liable for misleading or incorrect information provided to investors. Due to these difficulties, an investor cap is necessary to mitigate loses by investors that may have no recourse against an issuer.
VI Conclusion
The purpose of crowd funding is to facilitate the investment of "relatively small amounts".
There is no indication of what a small amount is. With no investor cap, there is the potential for an investor to contribute any amount they wish, whether it is large or small. type of funding and the small offers exclusion. The small offers regime is aimed at larger investments but has other important protections such as the maximum number of 20 investors and the need for a "personal" offer, which protects the investor through the personal relationship that exists with the issuer.
173
The liability regime is unclear for offers outside of Part 3 and makes it difficult for an investor to get relief where the information they based their decision to invest on was incorrect. Relief could be sought under Part 2 but is more limited, which increases the importance of protecting investors through a combination of investor caps, disclosure and risk warnings.
Disclosure for crowd funding issues will be less than what would otherwise be required if Part 3 applied. Less disclosure means less information for investors, which warrants the inclusion of other investor protection mechanisms. Although risk warnings and alternative reduced disclosure are helpful, they do little to protect an unsophisticated investor from themselves. This is particularly so if the investor can satisfy a warning requirement by checking a box on an internet page. An inexperienced investor may be prone to ignore or downplay the risks when faced with an offer hyped by the crowd to be the next big thing, leading to over investing. If they do lose their money, those investors could then turn to the government for compensation, claiming they were not properly protected.
A five per cent cap of the amount being raised in an issue per investor would be adequate to mitigate the risks of significant financial losses while still allowing for diversification of an investment portfolio. Minimum disclosure obligations should be clearly set out in the regulations, with options for either greater disclosure or stricter investor caps for raises of greater amounts, for example requiring higher level disclosure where the caps allow for an investment above $10,000 per investor in the issuer within a 12 month period. The current approach of greater disclosure where there is no investor cap is contrary to the principles of the exclusion and does little to protect an investor from the identified risks. Given the uncertainty around liability for faulty disclosure and the significant risks of illiquidity and default, an approach that both favours the investor and keeps costs low for the issuer would be most appropriate.
VII Appendix: Nominee Shareholding
Some crowd funding models involve the platform provider acting as a nominee shareholder for investors. Holding securities on behalf of investors is prohibited in the United States. 174 This prohibition has been criticised as overly restrictive and discouraging diversification where investors are already limited in the amount they can invest and want to pool with other investors, deferring the management of their funds to a professional.
175
In New Zealand, this approach would be categorised as a Managed Investment Scheme.
176
Such an approach does not come within the definition of crowd funding and would require disclosure under Part 3 of the Act by the scheme operator. This would not prevent the scheme itself from investing in issuers looking to raise funds outside of the Act through another exclusion.
As an alternative, there is no prohibition against holding shares on behalf of the investor as a trustee, allowing for nominee shareholding as long as the investor directs what shares are acquired. This would provide a benefit to the issuer by only requiring communication to a single shareholder instead of every crowd funding investor, but does not have any obvious advantages for the investor. The investor could also call in the legal title at any time from the trustee, which ultimately defeats the purpose of such an arrangement.
174 Securities Act 15 USC § 78c(a)(80)(D). 175 Williamson, above n 75, at 2077. 176 Section 9(1). 
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